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Introduction
International human rights law imposes obligations on states. Con-
ceptually, however, human rights obligations are unlimited in their
addressees. They are grounded in human dignity, which inheres in all indi-
viduals regardless of who is in a position to affect these obligations. This
perception is embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), the foundation of international human rights law, which speaks
of the entitlement of "everyone" to the rights enumerated in it and does not
indicate the addressees of the concomitant obligations.' There is thus
nothing in human rights theory that precludes the imposition of legal obli-
gations on actors other than states. Indeed, states are hardly the only enti-
ties capable of infringing upon human dignity. Optimally, protection of
human rights should therefore extend to all situations in which these rights
are threatened, irrespective of who puts them in jeopardy. Some domestic
legal systems already impose human rights obligations on individuals. The
t Sha'arei Mishpat College, Hod Hasharon, Israel. I am grateful to Chris Borgen
and to David Kretzmer for discussing with me some of the issues raised in this Article, to
Marko Milanovic, Cedric Ryngaert, and Yuval Shany for comments to earlier versions,
and to Yael Naggan for excellent research assistance. Responsibility for errors remains
solely with me. Email: yael.ronen@mail.huji.ac.il.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (111), U.N. Doc. A/801
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present international legal structure, under which human rights obliga-
tions are imposed only on states, is therefore neither self-evident nor
immutable. Yet despite continuous challenges, the international legal sys-
tem remains largely state-centered. Imposition of human rights obligations
directly on non-state actors (NSAs) would be a significant modification of
international law that would require the careful delineation of the contours
of such NSAs and their pertinent obligations.
This Article considers the extension of international human rights law
to encompass a particular category of NSAs, namely those that exercise
effective territorial control to the exclusion of a government (territorial
NSAs). Examples of such entities include, as detailed below, Transnistria,
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Somaliland, the Pales-
tinian Authority, Tamil Eelam (until 2009), as well as South Ossetia and
Nagorno-Karabach. Part I discusses the need for extending international
human rights law to NSAs, suggesting that it is particularly appropriate to
do so for territorial NSAs. This section also considers the breadth of such
an extension. Part II assesses the present state of the law by examining
state practice, decisions of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, and reports
of experts in order to determine whether human rights obligations already
apply to NSAs as a matter of customary international law. The Article con-
cludes with observations about the direction in which the notion of NSA
responsibility for human rights violations may be developing at present.
1. Lex Ferenda
A. Why Impose Human Rights Obligations on NSAs?
Human rights law was designed to curb the use of public power over
those who are subject to that power. For this reason it applies first and
foremost to the state, as the holder of public power.2 Criminal and civil law
regulate the conduct of other legal actors under both domestic and interna-
tional law. Thus, for example, individuals are not bound by the prohibi-
tion on arbitrarily denying the right to life, but by the penal prohibition on
killing.3 The almost exclusive attachment of human rights obligations to
states is premised on two interrelated notions. One is that domestic law
can effectively regulate action within a state's jurisdiction. Ordinarily, the
state itself would have an interest in addressing human rights violations
under its jurisdiction, making the intervention of international law unnec-
essary. The other notion is that states would not accept international regu-
lation of private entities.4 Since the emergence of the international human
rights regime, however, the structure of domestic and international society
has evolved and power relations have changed. NSAs have emerged that
2. Nigel S. Rodley, Can Armed Opposition Groups Violate Human Rights?, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 297, 299 (Kathleen E. Maho-
ney & Paul Mahoney eds., 1993).
3. See id. at 300-01.
4. Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibil-
ity, 111 Yale LJ. 443, 466, 469 (2001).
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are increasingly wielding powers similar in character to those of states and
often exceed the latter in their effectiveness. Insofar as such actors are
empowered by the state, act according to its instructions, directions or con-
trol, or effectively replace it, the state is internationally responsible for
those acts. The state is also responsible when it endorses the acts of
NSAs.5 But NSAs often have the capacity to act beyond the control of
states; it is sometimes the case that states have neither the interest in, nor
the resources for, holding NSAs accountable under domestic law. Conse-
quently, maintaining states as the exclusive holders of human rights obli-
gations may lead to an inadequate guarantee of these rights.
This realization has led to the development of new bodies of law estab-
lishing the accountability of NSAs for acts that essentially constitute viola-
tions of human rights; thus, some types of NSAs-and individuals within
them-are already directly bound by certain international legal norms that
essentially protect human rights, albeit under a different legal classification
and in narrowly-circumscribed contexts. These norms include, first and
foremost, international humanitarian law and international criminal law,
However, the present framework of responsibility applicable to NSAs does
not provide an adequate response to the full array of human rights that
they may infringe upon. International humanitarian law, which applies to
armed groups, covers only a small number of rights regarded as a mini-
mum core that can (and must) be complied with in any situation; natu-
rally, international humanitarian law applies only during armed conflict.
International criminal law imposes criminal responsibility on individuals
for acts that violate human rights, such as genocide, crimes against human-
ity, and certain violations of the laws of armed conflict, but because it
constitutes the most severe type of sanctions, international criminal law is
limited to the gravest human rights violations.6 Consequently, NSAs that
exercise powers similar to those of states often remain unaccountable for
their abuse of that power because their conduct does not amount to inter-
national crimes and is not related to an armed conflict. For example, the
Al Shabaab clan in Somalia (the most powerful and effective armed faction
in Somalia, which, by the end of 2009, controlled more territory than any
other faction in Somalia) imposes a harsh religious code on behavior.7
This conduct is tantamount to the violation of numerous rights, including
freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of movement and the
right to equality. The rights in question are not protected by international
5. Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, 53d Sess., arts. 36, 42-44, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; 56
U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10 (2001).
6. Ratner, supra note 4, at 466.
7. See, e.g., AMM & Others v. Sec'y of State for Home Dep't, [2011] UKUT 00445,
[90] (appeal taken from the UKAIT) ("In the areas of their control, Al-Shabab was enforc-
ing 'a particularly draconian version of Sharia law, which goes well beyond the tradi-
tional interpretation of Islam in Somalia . . . and in fact amounts to a repressive form of
social control'. AI-Shabab were concerned 'with every little detail of daily life, including
men's and women's style of dress, the length of men's beards, the style of music being
listened to and the choice of mobile phone ringtone."') (citations omitted).
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criminal law or by the laws of armed conflict. The fact that Al Shabaab's
conduct may be sanctioned under domestic Somali law offers no remedy,
because the domestic legal system is unable to enforce the law on the
group's members.
There is, therefore, a need to bridge the gap between the extensive
powers of NSAs and the limited forms of responsibility that apply to them
at present by extending the reach of international human rights obliga-
tions.8 Yet states are reluctant to attribute human rights obligations to
NSAs under international law, or, for that matter, under domestic law.9
First, states are generally loath to extend any international law to such
entities, as such extension could in some instances further the latter's
endeavors to acquire international status.10 Second, as a matter of fact,
human rights ordinarily constitute domestic matters. Even if states have
accepted that legally human rights are no longer exclusively a domestic
issue because of the insufficiency of domestic law to guard the victims, in
practice international intervention, legal or otherwise, is still disfavored.
The regulation of states' human rights obligations by international law
remains the exception to the primacy of regulation by domestic law.
The tension between the need to regulate the conduct of NSAs that are
beyond the effective reach of states and the reservations regarding attach-
ing human rights obligations to NSAs is evident in the debate on corporate
liability for human rights violations. Great strides have been made in the
development of corporate accountability for human rights, but consensus
was reached on the adoption of Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights" only on the understanding that any corporate responsibil-
ity stems from societal expectations rather than human rights law.' 2 An
example of the objection to entrenching corporate responsibility in human
rights law is the failed attempt in the United States in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petrolium Co.' 3 to recognize civil corporate liability under the U.S. Alien
8. A further challenge would be to create mechanisms for enforcing these obliga-
tions. See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 4, at 461.
9. See, e.g., Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012).
10. See, e.g., Beate Rudolf, Non-State Actors in Areas of Limited Statehood as Address-
ees of Public International Law Norms on Governance, 4 Hum. RTs. & INT'L LEGAL Dis-
COURSE 127, 128 (2010).
11. See Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights
and Transnational Corps. and Other Bus. Enters., Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Frame-
work, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Rug-
gie). These principles were adopted by the Human Rights Council. See Human Rights
Council Res. 17/4, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises, 17th Sess., May 30-June 17, 2011, A/HRC/RES/17/4 (June 16, 2011).
12. See Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights
and Transnational Corps. and Other Bus. Enters., Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Frame-
work for Business and Human Rights, Human Rights Council, 9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5
(Apr. 7, 2008) (by John Ruggie).
13. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Pet. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 133-44 (2d Cir. 2010). The case
was pending before the Supreme Court on the issue of extraterritorial applicability of
the statute when the Article was completed.
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Tort Statute,' 4 although state practice is far from uniform.' 5
Nonetheless, one can perceive of some instances in which states might
be willing, if not eager, to recognize the applicability of human rights obli-
gations to NSAs. States might be willing to do so in situations where such
applicability would exempt the states themselves from responsibility. This
means of evading responsibility may become increasingly attractive as a
counterweight to the growing phenomenon of holding states responsible
for failure to prevent conduct which amounts to human rights violations by
NSAs over which they exercise some control. 16
B. Requisite Characteristics for Imposition of Human Rights
Obligations on NSAs
Since international human rights obligations have been formulated
with states in mind as duty holders, the obligations are tailor-made for
states. They correspond to the manner in which states operate and to their
actual and normative capacities. There is, therefore, no doubt that states
are capable of discharging these obligations. Extension of human rights
obligations to NSAs cannot be based on a similar assumption, namely that
all NSAs possess characteristics that justify the imposition of human rights
obligations or that all NSAs are capable of discharging such obligations.
NSAs are not a homogenous group of actors, but rather are defined merely
by the exclusion of their members from the community of states. The term
"NSA" does not positively indicate any common features.' 7 In order to
determine whether human rights obligations should be imposed on NSAs,
it is necessary to first identify the characteristics of an entity that would
justify and enable the imposition of human rights on it.
Conveniently, the lively debate in the early twenty-first century over
the extent of states' extraterritorial obligations under international human
rights law' 8 has provided insight into key elements on which the imposi-
tion of international obligations rests. First and foremost, states' obliga-
tions are triggered by the exercise of effective territorial control, reflecting
14. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). But see In re South African
Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
15. For a review of state practice with regard to corporations, see Jordan Paust,
Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801
(2002), as well as Erin E. McKenna, Viera & Others v. Eli Lilly & Co. & Others, District
Court Judgment, Case No 1:09-cv-00495-RLY-DML (SD Ind 2010); ILDC 1561 (US 2010),
OxFoRD REP. ON INT'L LAw DOMESTIC CTS., 11 Al-A2 (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.
oxfordlawreports.com/subscriber article?script=yes&id=/oril/Cases/law-ildc-1561usl0
&recno=5&module=ildc&year-2010.
16. See Ilascu v. Moldova, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 291-96.
17. See Philip Alston, The 'Not-a-Cat' Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights
Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HuMAN RIGHTS 3
(Philip Alston ed., 2005).
18. See, e.g., ExTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (Fons
Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004); MARKO MILNovic, EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF HuMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY (2011); Michael J.
Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict
and Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 119 (2005); Theodor Meron, Extraterritorial-
ity of Human Rights Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (1995).
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the notion that power comes with responsibility. 19 Nothing in this princi-
ple, however, limits its applicability to states. There is some controversy
over whether the exercise of effective control must be over a territory, or
whether control over a person through the exercise of particular govern-
mental functions is sufficient to trigger human rights obligations. 20 There
is a growing acceptance that any control may give rise to obligations,
whether or not that control is territorial. 21 Arguably, the same may apply
to NSAs. In fact, under international humanitarian law, Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions already imposes certain obligations on NSA
parties to a conflict even if they do not exercise territorial control.22 The
scope of Common Article 3 is nonetheless limited, focusing on obligations
of abstention. Yet even under international humanitarian law, the expan-
sion of Common Article 3 into Additional Protocol II applies only to
"organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to . . . implement
this Protocol."23
Territorial control is significant for the imposition of human rights
obligations in a number of ways. First, it constitutes evidence of a lack of
control by the state, which justifies regulation of the situation by interna-
tional law. Second, it is a necessary requisite for human rights law to be
imposed as a comprehensive body of law rather than on a pick-and-choose
basis. Since territorial control provides, at least prima facie, powers which
affect the full gamut of human rights of individuals within the territory, it
enables imposition of the full gamut of corresponding obligations. In con-
trast, non-territorial, functional control, such as withholding travel docu-
ments in a manner that impedes movement,24 or disclosing information in
a manner that intrudes on privacy, is identified by reference to specific
powers and therefore gives rise only to specific obligations or clusters of
obligations. Third, effective territorial control is necessary in order to pro-
tect rights as opposed to merely respecting them.25 It emerges, therefore,
19. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, HUDOC 1 74-80 (July 7,
2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-105606.
20. Compare Human Rights Comm., Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Commc'n No. R.12/
52, 41 2.1, 12.3, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40. (A/36/40) (1981), and Human Rights
Commc'n, Montero v. Uruguay, Commc'n No. 106/1981, 'N 7.1, 9.3-9.4, U.N. Doc.
Supp. No. 40 (A/38/40) (1982), with Bankovi v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333.
21. Al-Skeini, App. No. 55721/07, HUDOC at 57-59.
22. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
23. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 1,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
24. Human Rights Comm., L6pez Burgos v. Uruguay, supra note 20, 2.1, 12.3;
Human Rights Comm., Montero v. Uruguay, supra note 20, 9T 7.1, 9.3-9.4.
25. MuANovic, supra note 18, at 210.
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that while obligations based on non-territorial, functional control may be
imposed ad hoc on numerous actors, a categorical imposition of interna-
tional human rights law as a comprehensive body of law is only appropri-
ate with respect to entities that exercise effective territorial control.
A second requisite for imposing human rights obligations on NSAs
should be the existence of an organizational apparatus exercising public
functions and capable of securing human rights, although the apparatus
need not be sophisticated (in many instances, unfortunately, this same
apparatus also enables the infringement of rights in the first place). There
is no point in holding an NSA accountable under human rights law if it
does not have the capacity to formulate and execute policy. This requisite
is often circumstantially linked to the previous one: in order to establish
and sustain territorial control, it is often necessary to possess an organiza-
tional apparatus. An NSA in effective control of territory is, therefore, likely
to have such an apparatus. It is conceivable that non-state groups would
maintain sufficient control over territory to remove the state's forces with-
out establishing alternative governing mechanisms, but such groups would
not be bound by international human rights law. 26
A third requisite is independent functioning of the territorial NSA.
Since obligations follow from the exercise of powers, obligations (and
responsibility) should only attach to actors that are capable of acting inde-
pendently and are therefore in a position to modify their conduct where
required. Independence is inherent to statehood, but with respect to other
entities it is anything but evident. The independence at issue is factual
rather than normative, bringing to the fore the primacy of effective control
over international title as a trigger for obligations; although in instances
where the independence of an NSA is in question, formal authority of a
state over it may constitute rebuttable evidence of factual subordination.
Thus, NSAs that operate within the constitutional system of a state, such as
municipalities and autonomous regions, are prima facie under state con-
trol and are not independent, and their acts are attributable, under interna-
tional law, to the state.27 International human rights law does not directly
bind them. Even if the constitutional system is such that it allows a sub-
state entity to act in a manner which constitutes a violation of human
rights obligations by which the state is bound,2 8 international responsibil-
ity remains with the state. 29
Conversely, when a sub-state NSA denies the authority of the state
over its territory and succeeds in effectively preventing the state from
26. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Civil and
Political Rights, including the Questions of Disappearances and Summary Executions, 9 76,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/7 (Dec. 22, 2004) (by Philip Alston).
27. Int'l Law Comm'n., supra note 5, at 84-92.
28. LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 1999 LC.]. 9, 16 (Mar. 3); Avena
and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 1.CJ. 12, 65 (Mar. 31).
29. As long as the sub-state entity accepts its constitutional position in practice, the
constitutional system can be, at least in theory, amended so as to put the sub-state
entity's powers in line with the state's obligations. See, e.g., Int'l Law Comm'n, supra
note 5, at 232-33.
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enforcing its authority, as in the case of a breakaway region, holding the
state responsible for the conduct of that NSA on the basis of the constitu-
tional framework has limited utility at best. Politically, the risk of being
held internationally responsible for conduct within a breakaway region
might act as an incentive for the state to try to assert its control over the
territory,3 0 but legally, the obligation must follow effective control rather
than vice versa. For example, there was little point in attributing responsi-
bility to Sri Lanka for human rights violations by the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE), nor does it makes sense to hold Moldova responsible
for human rights violations by the authorities in Transnistria (beyond the
obligation to take measures to protect individuals from those violations3 '),
despite the fact that both of the breakaway regions have been subject to the
authority of the central governments under domestic law. 32
The priority of effective territorial control over formal authority in trig-
gering human rights obligations exists even when that formal authority
itself is grounded in international law. For example, under the law of occu-
pation, an occupying power cannot evade its responsibilities under the
Fourth Geneva Convention towards protected persons through agreement
with the authorities of the occupied territories.3 3 The formal authority of
the occupying power, which stems from its effective control under the law
of occupation and which establishes its status as an occupying power,
gives rise to a presumption of effective control also for the purpose of inter-
national human rights law. Accordingly, if the local authorities of the
occupied territory exercise powers granted to them under an agreement
with the occupying power in a manner which violates the rights of individ-
uals under its control, it may be argued that the occupying power remains
responsible for that conduct. However, if in practice the local authorities
are capable of acting at their own discretion, attaching the responsibility to
the occupying power beyond the mere obligation to protect would serve
little purpose. At the same time, independence does not mean exclusivity
of control. While we might hold the Transnistrian authorities responsible
under human rights law, this does not necessarily eliminate the responsi-
bility of the Russian Federation for its own acts within the region. Effective
30. One can, however, imagine more powerful incentives for regaining territorial
control than the need to comply with international human rights law. Note Moldova's
argument before the European Court of Human Rights "that they [Moldova] had dis-
charged their positive obligations, both general, in terms of finding a solution to the
conflict and re-establishing their control over Transdniestrian territory, and specific, in
terms of securing the applicants' Convention rights," implying that reassertion of territo-
rial control could be a legal obligation. 1lascu v. Moldova, 2004-VIl Eur. Ct. H.R. 260.
31. Id. at 267-72.
32. When signing the European Convention on Human Rights, Moldova made the
following reservation: "The Republic of Moldova declares that it will be unable to guar-
antee compliance with the provisions of the Convention in respect of omissions and acts
committed by the organs of the self-proclaimed Trans-Dniester republic within the terri-
tory actually controlled by such organs, until the conflict in the region is finally settled."
General Information, 1997 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. 35.
33. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
supra note 22, at 318.
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control can be shared, and if it is, the resultant obligations would also be
shared.
The notion that international human rights law should bind a group
with an identifiable political structure exercising effective control over terri-
tory and population has been put forward by Philip Alston, Special U.N.
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions. He sug-
gested, "in some contexts it may be desirable to address the activities of
such groups within some part of the human rights equation."34 Emphasiz-
ing that "in an era when non-State actors are becoming ever more impor-
tant in world affairs, the Commission risks handicapping itself
significantly if it does not respond in a realistic but principled manner," he
clarified that "condemnation of such groups and insisting that they respect
international human rights law should not be taken as equating them with
States" or seeking to give them legitimacy.3 5 Thus, addressing such territo-
rial NSAs within the human rights context could mean sending complaints
to them regarding executions and calling for them to respect relevant
norms. In cases where NSAs are willing to "affirm their adherence to
human rights principles and to eschew executions it may be appropriate to
encourage the adoption of formal statements to that effect." 3 6 Further-
more, in reporting on violations committed by governments, it may be
appropriate to "provide details of the atrocities perpetrated by their oppo-
nents in order to provide the Commission with an accurate and complete
picture of the situation."3 7
Territorial entities that fulfill the requisites proposed above take
diverse shapes. In Somalia, the government has ceased to exercise effective
control over any part of the state's territory and has been replaced by
numerous territorial NSAs. In other regions, breakaway entities exercise
effective territorial control to the exclusion of the government, for example,
Transnistria in Moldova, the TRNC in Cyprus,3 8 and, until 2009, the LTTE
in Sri Lanka. One might also include Taiwan in this category, depending
on how one views the relationship between it and mainland China. Terri-
torial NSAs of a different character altogether include the Palestinian
Authority in the West Bank and the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip. The
Palestinian Authority operates in non-sovereign territory under Israeli
occupation but in many respects independently of it, while the Hamas
regime exercises effective territorial control to the exclusion not of a state
but of the Palestinian Authority, which is recognized as the representative
of the Palestinians' right to self-determination. 3 9
34. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, supra
note 26, 9 76.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. In these cases the issue may be not whether to hold the NSA responsible, but of
correctly identifying the government that is in effective control. E.g. Ilaycu v. Moldova,
2004-VlI Eur. Ct. H.R. 339 (Kovler, J., dissenting).
39. The discussion in this Article excludes U.N.-mandated international territorial
administration, the conduct of which is governed by specific norms that, if emanating
29
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In addition to the factual criteria for holding an NSA bound under
international law, the question arises whether the imposition of human
rights obligations on territorial NSAs should also be guided by normative
criteria, such as the legality of the entity's existence under international
law (to the extent that the existence of a territorial NSA is at all regulated
under international law),4 0 the legality of its conduct under other branches
of law, or its legal entitlements. In this context, the relevance of the right to
self-determination may arise. This right has been recognized as a "prereq-
uisite to the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights."4 ' One argu-
ment may be that NSAs striving for self-determination may not be
burdened with human rights obligations until they achieve their goal.
However, this argument is misplaced: self-determination has been cited as
a requisite for the enjoyment of human rights in the context of the demand
for decolonization, in rejection of the claim that human rights can be guar-
anteed even under foreign domination. It supports a claim for a right to
political independence. But NSAs operating independently of states-
whether with the benefit of the right to self-determination or not-already
possess the qualities of governance that the right to self-determination
aims to guarantee. Thus, an NSA's failure to achieve self-determination in
its fullest sense-political independence-is no ground for exemption from
obligations and responsibility. Any other interpretation would lead to the
absurd result that an NSA that lacks the right to self-determination is also
exempt from human rights obligations. More generally, if human rights
obligations are intended to serve as a check on abuses of power, it would
seem that factual, rather than normative, factors should trigger such
obligations.
C. The Scope of Human Rights Obligations of Territorial NSAs
Human rights are inherent to the individual, but they are a political
enterprise, reflecting a certain vision of society. By prescribing the limits
and requirements of social conduct, they purport to shape society in a cer-
tain fashion.4 2 Any analysis of the scope of human rights must, therefore,
refer to the context in which they operate. This is not to suggest, however,
that human rights are relative. They are universal in that they inhere in
every individual, everywhere, and at all times. But as legal entitlements,
human rights have been directed primarily at states as duty-holders and
envisage a state-centered international society. The existing human rights
catalogue is, by definition, a catalogue of human rights in state-individual
from U.N. Charter Chapter VIl resolutions, may even have hierarchical superiority over
general international law. The Article is limited to a discussion of the lowest common
denominator-customary international law.
40. E.g. S.C. Res. 541, 'T 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/541 (Nov. 18, 1983) (regarding the
illegality of the establishment of the TRNC).
41. Resolution on the Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-Determination, G.A. Res.
637 (VII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/637(VII) (Dec. 16, 1952).
42. SeeJACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 14-16 (2d
ed. 2003) (describing how the aspirational features of human rights theories can impact
political and social practices).
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relations. An international human rights catalogue tailored for other rela-
tionships, namely between individuals and actors other than states, might
well differ from the one currently prevailing.43 Had the human rights pro-
ject been tailored for intrafamilial relations, for example, it would probably
not have included the right to fair trial, but might have included a right to
compassion. Accordingly, in considering the expansion of international
human rights law to territorial NSAs, the question arises whether the lat-
ter's scope of functions entails applying to them a modified human rights
catalogue. It is submitted that if territorial NSAs are defined by virtue of
their capacity to exercise public functions, the same spectrum of obliga-
tions that applies to states should apply to them, regardless of whether they
actually engage in the full scope of public functions. Furthermore, if terri-
torial NSAs claim to be states, or claim a right to become states by virtue of
the right to self-determination, they cannot in good faith reject the applica-
bility of norms that attach to statehood.
Another question is whether the interests that are presently recognized
under international human rights law as justified grounds for limiting
human rights are applicable to NSAs. These permissible limitations protect
interests that are regarded as legitimate and worthy of protection. Some of
these interests would be legitimate and worthy of protection even if pur-
sued by NSAs. This would be particularly true for interests that involve the
protection of other human rights, such as public health, the rights and free-
doms of others, and public order. Other interests, however, might not
enjoy the same normative force where NSAs are concerned. For example,
one ground for limiting human rights is the protection of national security.
This limitation derives from a state's right to protect its existence, territo-
rial integrity, and political independence against force or threat of force.44
NSAs do not, generally speaking, have a right to independence or territorial
integrity, nor to non-interference. Prima facie, then, national security is
not a relevant ground for limiting NSAs' obligations. However, particular
NSAs may have a right to self-determination, from which derive the rights
to independence and territorial integrity. Arguably, the obligations of such
NSAs merit some limitations in order to protect these other interests.
According to this line of thought, however, delineating the extent of an
43. See, for example, the understanding of a changing emphasis insofar as the obli-
gations of corporations are concerned: "In practice, some human rights may be at
greater risk than others in particular industries or contexts, and therefore will be the
focus of heightened attention. However, situations may change, so all human rights
should be the subject of periodic review." Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-
General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corp. and other Bus. Enters.,
supra note 11, ' 12. The unarticulated context of human rights has been criticized, for
example, for perpetuating the public-private divide. See, e.g., Christine Chinkin, A Cri-
tique of the Public/Private Dimension, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 387, 389 (1999) ("Human rights
discourse . . . largely excludes abuses committed by private actors."). This particular
critique is of little relevance for present purposes, because territorial NSAs operate in the
public sphere; however, the critique illustrates the ingrained bias of the human rights
project.
44. See U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Status of the International Covenants on
Human Rights, 39, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4, Annex (Sept. 28, 1984).
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NSA's obligations requires a debate over the legitimacy of its existence and
of its interests. This creates the difficulty, reminiscent of the ius ad bellum
and ius in bello distinction, of rendering the individuals under the NSAs'
control hostage to political disputes. Under human rights law, no less than
under international humanitarian law, protection of the individual should
not depend on political circumstances. Accordingly, the human rights cat-
alogue should remain intact regardless of the type of the entity in question.
Conversely, one might query whether territorial NSAs have legitimate
interests that states do not. Again, in order to avoid the politicization of
determining human rights obligations, the catalogue of human rights
should remain intact. Rather, the differences between the interests of terri-
torial NSAs and the interests of states, whether the latter are wider or nar-
rower, should be expressed in the weight attached to these interests in
specific circumstances, and not in the adoption of differentiated grounds
for restricting rights. That weight would be reflected in the assessment of
the need for the limitation on the right and its proportionality with respect
to the harm caused. The extent of external scrutiny of NSAs might also be
different from that applicable to states. For example, the margin of protec-
tion from external scrutiny that states enjoy derives from the prohibition
on interference in domestic affairs. If this prohibition does not protect ter-
ritorial NSAs, there might be greater inclination by outside actors to scruti-
nize territorial NSAs' policies.
A final issue is the territorial reach of NSAs' human rights obligations.
Although territorial NSAs are defined by their exercise of effective territo-
rial control rather than by formal title to territory, they may also be capable
of exercising functional control extraterritorially. Thus, the possibility that
NSAs have extraterritorial obligations has not been entirely discounted.
For example, the U.N. Secretary-General's Panel of Experts on Sri Lanka
explained that it did not consider the LTTE's abuses outside the conflict
zone (which covers the area where it is in effective territorial control) due
to "uncertainty" as to extra-territorial obligations.4 5 In other words, the
experts, who regarded the LTTE as bound by human rights law as a matter
of positive law, did not rule out the possibility that even if the applicability
of human rights obligations to NSAs is initially triggered by effective terri-
torial control, such obligations may subsequently extend beyond the con-
trolled territory.46
45. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General's Panel of Experts on
Accountability in Sri Lanka, ' 243 (Mar. 31, 2011), available at www.un.org/News/dh/
infocus/SriLanka/POEReportFull.pdf. For other reservations regarding the findings
relating to the LTTE, see infra notes 130, 143 and accompanying text.
46. According to the Panel, the LTTE was bound to respect the most basic human
rights of persons within its power, since it exercises "de facto control over a part of a
State's territory." U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 45, 1 188.
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D. Enforcement of Territorial NSAs' International Human Rights
Obligations
If, or when, territorial NSAs are recognized as bound by international
human rights law, enforcing their obligations will remain a challenge.
Without doubt, territorial NSAs would be under a duty to provide repara-
tion for breaches of these obligations. This is a general principle of law,4 7
and it is reasonable to regard it as applicable to all international actors that
are capable of breaching obligations, including territorial NSAs.
The international legal duty to provide reparation accrues regardless
of the existence of formal institutions for its enforcement, but undoubtedly
the absence of such institutions is a major obstacle. However, the present
structure of the international human rights regime is not conducive to
enforcement of territorial NSAs' human rights obligations. Treaties and
treaty-monitoring bodies-both courts and U.N. committees-are all
reserved to states and interaction with states. It is, therefore, impossible to
enforce the obligations of territorial NSAs directly on them through these
mechanisms. Moreover, if states are reluctant to grant formal status to ter-
ritorial NSAs, they are unlikely to adopt formal mechanisms for enforce-
ment of NSAs' obligations.
Within domestic contexts, jurisdictional limits may constrain adjudi-
cation of claims under international law against NSAs. This is demonstra-
ble in the practice of the United States, which is perhaps the most
conducive forum for adjudication based on international human rights law
because it permits parties to bring suit based on violations of the law of
nations.48 In 2011, in Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Authority, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed the question of
whether, for the purposes of applying the Alien Tort Statute, NSAs could be
held responsible for torture under customary international law.49 The
court held that there was no cause of action against the respondents
because there was no consensus that torture by private actors violated
international law.50 This decision followed the court's ruling almost two
decades earlier in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, where it stated that it
did not believe that "the law of nations imposes the same responsibility or
liability on non-state actors, such as the [Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion] PLO, as it does on states and persons acting under color of state
law."51 The analysis in Tel-Oren revolved around the responsibility of indi-
viduals, but Judge Bork, in a concurring opinion, addressed the specific
characteristics of the PLO, clarifying that "a finding that because of its gov-
ernmental aspirations and because of the role it has played in the Middle
47. See Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.Lj. (ser. A) No. 9, at 21 (July 26).
48. See Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) ("The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.").
49. Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Authority, 642 F.3d 1088, 1095-97 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
50. See id.
51. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per
curiam).
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East conflicts the PLO should be subject to such rules would establish a
new principle of international law."52 The fact that, subsequent to the Tel-
Oren ruling, the Palestinian Authority had acquired effective territorial con-
trol53 in practice but also under international law,54 does not appear to
have been relevant for the Court in Ali Shafi.
These rulings do not represent a blanket rejection of NSA liability
under international law as a matter of substantive international law;
indeed, Ali Shafi distinguished torture from other acts such as piracy and
genocide, for which responsibility can lie with NSAs.55 Rather, their con-
cern is with the jurisdiction of U.S. courts under domestic law, which the
Supreme Court has interpreted to encompass only those violations of inter-
national law that satisfy a minimum threshold of specificity and universal-
ity. 56 Practical concerns informed this interpretation: in Ali Shafi, the
court reiterated that "the determination whether a norm is sufficiently def-
inite to support a cause of action should (and, indeed, inevitably must)
involve an element of judgment about the practical consequences of mak-
ing that cause available to litigants in the federal courts."57 The court was
guided by the Supreme Court's instruction on the need for "great caution
in adapting the law of nations to private rights."58 It candidly admitted the
true bar to U.S. courts holding an NSA bound by international human
rights law, namely that this "could open the doors of the federal courts to
claims against nonstate actors anywhere in the world alleged to have cru-
elly treated any alien."59 According to U.S. jurisprudence, the state/non-
state distinction is not merely a convenient parameter for determining
whether a claim should be admitted, but a proxy for identifying the speci-
ficity of the alleged violation of international law, since "state action, or
complicity therewith, may also be a powerful indicia of a violation that 'is
sufficiently definite to support a cause of action' . . . ."60
Given the obstacles to adjudication, what remains are political means
of enforcement through the numerous political U.N. bodies entrusted with
monitoring human rights situations around the world, such as the Human
Rights Council and its sub-organs, the General Assembly's Third Commit-
tee, and the ECOSOC and its sub-organs; states and international organiza-
tions can also unilaterally enforce human rights norms. The U.N. Security
Council has also declared certain NSAs-specifically, armed opposition
52. Id. at 806 (Bork, J., concurring). Judge Bork also described the particular diffi-
culty in attributing responsibility for torture to a NSA given the norm's formulation. Id.
at 849.
53. In 1984, the Palestinian Authority did not yet have any territorial control, nor
had a declaration of independence been yet made; there was, therefore, no territorial
NSA or purported state.
54. See Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Isr.-Palestine Liber-
ation Organization, art. I, Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 557 (1997).
55. Ali Shafi, 642 F.3d at 1094-97.
56. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732-33, 738 (2004).
57. Ali Shafi, 642 F.3d at 1095 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732-33).
58. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 694; see also Ali Shafi, 642 F.3d at 1093.
59. Ali Shaft, 643 F.3d at 1094.
60. Estate of Amergi v. Palestinian Auth., 611 F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2010).
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groups-accountable for human rights violations and imposed enforce-
ment measures on individuals associated with such groups.61 The value of
political action is often contested on the ground that in the absence of coer-
cive enforcement, states are free to ignore criticism. But unlike states, terri-
torial NSAs-especially those campaigning for formal status-are
vulnerable to international censure and may be particularly amenable to
political pressure; their very existence, let alone their formal status,
depends on political clout. Political enforcement may, therefore, hold some
promise in that regard. As compliance with human rights law becomes an
increasingly visible criterion for recognition of international status, 62 polit-
ical demands in this area may also prove particularly powerful. That said,
the fact that NSAs do not participate in international relations diminishes
the opportunity to influence them through interaction and political
pressure.
II. Lex Lata
A. Introduction
There is no treaty law on international human rights obligations of
NSAs. The universal and regional human rights instrumentS63 are all for-
mulated in terms of states' obligations, with the exception of the UDHR,
which speaks of the rights of "everyone," ostensibly leaving open the ques-
tion of the duty-holder's identity. The UDHR also provides that nothing in
it "may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right
to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of
any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein,"6 4 suggesting that perhaps
not only states but also groups and individuals may be obligated under
it.6 5 However, reliance on the UDHR as positive law is difficult. The
61. See, e.g., Aristotle Constantinides, Human Rights Obligations and Accountability of
Armed Opposition Groups: The Practice of the UN Security Council, 4 Hum. RTs. & INT'L
LEGAL DiSCOURSE 89 (2010).
62. EUR. PARL. Ass'N., The Consequences of the War Between Georgia and Russia, Res.
No. 1633 (2008), http://www.assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewPDF.asp?FilelD=176
81&Language=EN; Roland Rich, Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the
Soviet Union, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 36, 40, 42-43 (1993).
63. Arab Charter on Human Rights, League of Arab States art. 3, May 22, 2004,
reprinted in 12 Int'l Hum. Rts. Rep. 893; African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peo-
ples' Rights art. 1,June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58; Amer-
ican Convention on Human Rights art. 1, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
64. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 30.
65. The Human Rights Committee's view is "that once the people are accorded the
protection of the rights under the Covenant, such protection devolves with territory and
continues to belong to them . . . ." High Comm'r for Human Rights, CCPR General
Comment No. 26: Continuity of Obligations, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1
(Dec. 8, 1997). Thus, obligations may devolve on to certain NSAs, namely international
territorial administrations. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted
by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the
Human Rights Committee: Kosovo (Serbia), 9 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1 (Aug.
14, 2006).
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UDHR's drafters intended for it to reflect aspirations rather than positive
law. Its content may have become customary law through its entrenchment
in the universal covenants and state practice, but those avenues only con-
cern state obligations. Accordingly, even if the UDHR addresses the obliga-
tions of NSAs, those obligations remain within the UDHR's original,
aspirational ambit.6 6
Reference is sometimes made to the possibility of holding NSAs
accountable under human rights law on the basis of agreements concluded
with them or of their voluntary undertakings.67 Both agreements and uni-
lateral undertakings replace a principled applicability of human rights law
to NSAs by ad hoc arrangements. However, how an NSA may commit itself
is a secondary question, the preliminary one being whether it can commit
itself. If NSAs are incapable of being bound by international human rights
law, a commitment on their part would not make them any more accounta-
ble under such law. This incapability can be compared to an NGO declar-
ing itself bound by the prohibition on the use of force. Such a declaration,
regardless of how public and unequivocal it may be, cannot render the
NGO bound by the prohibition, since the prohibition does not apply to
NGOs. Thus, whether NSAs are capable of being bound by international
human rights law depends not on their subjective stance, but on the law.
This is not to say that contractual or voluntary undertakings by NSAs are
entirely without value. First, breach of a legal commitment is itself a viola-
tion of an international obligation, which may carry international respon-
sibility (to the extent that NSAs have such responsibility) irrespective of
human rights law. Second, such an undertaking may carry weight in the
progressive development of customary international law. While customary
international law is traditionally based on practice and on opinio juris of
states, there are increasing calls to incorporate NSAs as creators of law.6 8
The limits of these calls and their relevance to the creation of human rights
66. For a detailed analysis of the UDHR as a source of obligations upon NSAs, see
Rodley, supra note 2, at 305-07.
67. With respect to unilateral undertakings by the Palestinian Authority and Hamas,
see Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the
United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, Human Rights Council, 12th
Sess., Sept. 14-Oct. 2, 2009, 1T 305-07, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009);
HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNDER COVER OF WAR: HAMAs POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN GAZA 20-21
(2009). As for agreements, see Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
supra note 54, which sets up the Palestinian Authority. Article XIX, entitled "Human
Rights and the Rule of Law," stipulates: "Israel and the Council [referred to today as the
Palestinian Authority] shall exercise their powers and responsibilities pursuant to this
Agreement with due regard to internationally-accepted norms and principles of human
rights and the rule of law." Id. art. XIX. Polisario, on behalf of The Sahrawi Arab Demo-
cratic Republic, has signed or ratified several human rights instruments, including: Pro-
tocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in
Africa, Sept. 13, 2000, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6; African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child, July 11, 1990, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49; African (Banjul)
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 63. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN WESTERN SAHARA AND IN THE TINDOUF REFUGEE CAMPS 20-21 (2008),
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wsaharal208web.pdf.
68. See, e.g., Roozbeh B. Baker, Customary International Law in the 21st Century: Old
Challenges and New Debates, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 173, 173-74, 198-99 (2010).
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law should nonetheless be acknowledged: they are made primarily in the
context of the laws of armed conflict, inter alia on the ground that NSAs
are already subject to certain obligations under these laws.69 Accordingly,
at issue might be a proposition on the desirability of regarding NSAs as
capable of creating customary international law, not generally, but only in
those areas where they are already subject to the law. Thus, the Special
Rapporteur's statement on the possibility of holding NSAs accountable on
the basis of their unilateral undertakings has to be read in the context in
which it was given, namely NSAs involved in armed conflict, 70 where treaty
law already expressly provides a mechanism by which NSAs may commit
themselves.71 With respect to human rights law, this would of course be a
circular argument, since practice is sought precisely in order to establish
whether NSAs are subject to the law. If so, their undertakings may consti-
tute relevant practice in the future. A third significance of contractual and
voluntary undertakings is that they may serve as factual evidence of effec-
tive and independent conduct if obligations are imposed on territorial
NSAs; failing that, they could at least estop NSAs from denying that they
are bound by the human rights regime in particular instances. 72
Another basis put forward for holding NSAs bound by human rights
law as a matter of existing law is the fact that various substantive human
rights norms have been identified as customary or even peremptory
norms73 and are therefore binding on all international legal actors74
(including territorial NSAs). However, the customary and peremptory
character of human rights norms has been established in the relations
between individuals and states. To conclude that they are also binding
upon NSAs would beg the question whether territorial NSAs are, in fact,
"international legal actors" for the purpose of human rights law.
There is, therefore, no alternative to examining whether customary
international law-created by states-imposes human rights obligations on
territorial NSAs. The distinction between state practice and opinio juris,
69. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
supra note 26, T 76.
70. Id.
71. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), art. 96, June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
72. It has been argued that attributing human rights obligations to territorial NSAs
exclusively on the basis of voluntary undertakings, whether unilateral or through agree-
ments, may send an unfortunate message that human rights law is discretionary. CAR-
STEN STAHN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION:
VERSAILLES TO IRAQ AND BEYOND 484 (2008). However, international human rights law is
in fact discretionary-whether it is entrenched in treaties or in customary international
law, which originated in voluntary conduct. Only peremptory human rights norms are
not discretionary. On what falls within this category, see ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI,
PEREMPTORY NoRms IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 53-60 (2006).
73. For example, the prohibition on torture and on racial discrimination. See
ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 72, at 55.
74. Andrew Clapham, The Rights and Responsibilities of Armed Non-State Actors:
The Legal Landscape & Issues Surrounding Engagement 10-15 (Feb. 2010) (draft for
comment), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid1569636.
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difficult under the best of circumstances,75 is particularly difficult in the
present context, where the practice more often consists of articulating
stances rather than performing tangible measures. It is also difficult to
locate articulations of states' positions regarding NSAs' human rights obli-
gations. This is not because there is any dispute that violations of human
rights may emanate from the actions of NSAs; states in fact acknowledge
this. For example, in GRB v. Sweden, the author of a 1998 communication
to the Committee Against Torture appealed against removal to Peru, argu-
ing that there was a substantial risk that the Sendero Luminoso (which was
in effective control of areas within Peru) would subject her to torture.76
Sweden recognized that while the acts of the Sendero Luminoso were not
attributable to the Peruvian authorities, "depending on the circumstances
in the individual case, grounds might exist to grant a person asylum
although the risk of persecution is not related to a Government but to a
non-governmental entity."77 Rather, the difficulty in locating states' posi-
tions on the responsibility of NSAs lies in the fact that typically human
rights violations by NSAs would trigger the obligations of states to protect
potential victims from the conduct of third parties. Thus, regardless of
who carries out the act itself, the obligation and responsibility usually lies
with some state, obviating the need to consider the NSAs' obligations.
Even where the conduct of a territorial NSA against which the state
has no obligation to protect is at issue, the question of territorial NSAs'
obligations arises in only a few instances as a matter of substantive inter-
national law due to jurisdictional bars to inquiry into the matter in both
international and domestic fora; fewer still are the instances where this
question is raised before judicial bodies.
B. State Practice
A main context in which the question of territorial NSAs' obligations
has been addressed is asylum and deportation proceedings, where asylum
claimants have argued that their lives were at risk due to NSAs operating in
the place of destination. The obligations of the NSAs arise only indirectly
in these situations, since the focus of the debate is on the compatibility of
the state's attempt to deport the individuals with the prohibition on refoul-
ment (the removal of a person to a place where his or her life and security
may be at harm). Asylum proceedings involve determining whether the
conduct in the place of destination, namely by the NSA, amounts to perse-
cution under the 1951 Convention on Refugees78 or to a violation of
75. See, e.g., Jorg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International
Law: Customary International Law and Some of Its Problems, 15 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 523
(2004).
76. See Comm. Against Torture, 20th Sess., G.R.B. v. Sweden, Commc'n No. 83/
1997, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/20/D/83/1997 (June 19, 1998).
77. Id. 9 4.14. For the same reason, perhaps, there was no discussion of whether a
NSA could commit torture.
78. Persecution is not defined in the Convention; however, acts that are recognized
as persecution are characteristically also violations of human rights. Under E.U. law, to
qualify as "persecution" an act must "be sufficiently serious by its nature or repetition as
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human rights under the human rights treaties. The question is particularly
acute with respect to Article 1 of the U.N. Convention Against Torture,
which defines torture as acts carried out in an official capacity or with
official instigation, consent, or acquiescence. 79 Consequently, where asy-
lum is sought from risk of torture, determining whether, as a matter of fact,
the risk to the applicant falls within the ambit of the Convention necessa-
rily raises the question whether an NSA is capable of acting in an "official
capacity."80 While this is a determination of fact, not of legal responsibil-
ity,"' in a few cases the pronouncements by states offer insights into their
positions with respect to the legal obligations pertaining to territorial
NSAs. An example of the explicit refusal of a state to regard NSAs as bound
by the prohibition on torture is the Australian position taken before the
Committee Against Torture. In Elmi v. Australia, Australia argued that dur-
ing the drafting of the Convention Against Torture there was no agreement
that the definition of torture should extend to private individuals acting in
a non-official capacity; accordingly, the prohibition should not apply to
members of Somali armed bands.82 This position is understandable given
the potential ramifications of holding Somali clans capable of committing
torture: it would severely limit the ability of states to turn away scores of
asylum claimants from Somalia (and possibly from other regions).
The reluctance of states to hold territorial NSAs responsible for human
rights violations is also evident in political statements. For example, the
European Union has issued statements deploring executions in Gaza on
numerous occasions but has carefully refrained from attributing legal obli-
gations to the NSAs beyond those they undertake voluntarily. These state-
ments note that the European Union considers capital punishment to be
cruel and inhuman, implying that it is a human rights violation. However,
they then proceed merely to declare that "[tihe de facto authorities in Gaza
should refrain from carrying out any further executions of prisoners and
comply with the de facto moratorium on executions put in place by the
Palestinian Authority, pending abolition of the death penalty in line with
to constitute a severe violation of basic human rights, in particular the rights from which
derogation cannot be made under Article 15(2) of the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms . . . ." Council Directive 2011/95/
EU, art. 9(a), 2011 OJ. (L 337) 9, 15.
79. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113.
80. See id.
81. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 29 (1989) ("Nonethe-
less, there is no question of adjudicating on or establishing the responsibility of the
receiving country, whether under general international law, under the Convention or
otherwise. In so far as any liability under the Convention is or may be incurred, it is
liability incurred by the extraditing Contracting State by reason of its having taken
action which has as a direct consequence the exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-
treatment."). Consequently, terminology such as "human rights violations" should be
construed as meaning "conduct that would amount to violations of obligations if carried
out by a state or endorsed by it," rather than a statement on the normative capacity of
NSAs.
82. Comm. Against Torture, 22d Sess., Elmi v. Australia, Commc'n No. 120/1998,
9 4.8, U.N. Doc, CAT/C/22/D/120/1998 (May 25, 1999).
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the global trend,"83 avoiding any mention of obligations under human
rights law. Similar statements have been made with respect to Taiwan.8 4
States and international organizations have also referred to NSAs car-
rying obligations under international human rights law. For example, the
E.U. Commission has expressed concern, in a periodic practice review,
about "human rights violations" by the Palestinian Authority.8" European
institutions have also commented on conduct by the self-proclaimed Trans-
nistrian authorities. In resolutions that address general practices as well as
individual incidents and persons, the European Parliament expressed con-
cern about the "lack of respect for fundamental freedoms and human
rights" in Transnistria86 and criticized "the latest example of human rights
violations in Transnistria."87 The resolution addressed the "degrading
treatment" of the applicants in Ilascu v. Moldova, who, among other things,
were "prohibited from returning to their homes."88 It also discussed "the
serious violations of human rights in Transnistria . . . particularly leading
to the denial of the rights of Romanians with the closure of Romanian-
language schools and the profanation of a Romanian cemetery in Transnis-
tria, as well as the violation of the political rights and liberties of the entire
population living in the area .... ."89 The Parliament also went so far as to
mention that "the self-proclaimed Transnistrian authorities continue to
refuse to comply with the ECHR ruling requiring them to put an end to the
unlawful and arbitrary detention" of the applicants in Ilacu v. Moldova.90
The Parliament not only attributed to the non-state Transnistrian authori-
ties primary obligations to respect human rights but also implied that
these authorities were bound by a judicial ruling of an institution reserved
for states that was not even addressed directly to them. International orga-
nizations also refer to the human rights obligations of territorial NSAs
when they engage with NSAs on human rights issues in post-conflict and
pre-independence situations, where the goal is to promote democratic prin-
ciples 91 or to support state-building. 92
83. Press Release, E.U. Missions in Jerusalem and Ramallah, Local EU Statement on
Gaza Executions (July 27, 2011); see Press Release, E.U. Missions in Jerusalem and
Ramallah, Local EU Statement on Death Sentence in Gaza (Jan. 19, 2012).
84. Press Release, European Union, Statement by the High Representative, Catherine
Ashton, on the Executions in Taiwan, A 090/11 (Mar. 4, 2011).
85. European Comm'n, Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2010
Country Report: Occupied Palestinian Territory 2, 4-6 (joint Staff Working Paper No. 303,
2011) ("However, concerns about human rights violations, in particular by the security
forces, have not declined . . . .").
86. Resolution on Human Rights in Moldova and in Transnistria in Particular, 2006
OJ. (C 291 E) 414, 415 (2006).
87. Resolution of 12 July 2007 on Human Rights Violations in Transnistria (Repub-
lic of Moldova), 2007 OJ. (C 175 E) 613, 613-14 (2007).
88. Id. at 613.
89. Id. at 614.
90. Resolution on Human Rights in Moldova and in Transnistria in Particular, supra
note 86, at 415.
91. OSCE field operations address the implementation of human rights standards
by states, NGOs, and individuals. But responsibility remains with the states. 1 OSCE
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A statement exceptional both in its explicitness and in its attachment
of obligations to NSAs was made by Israel before the Committee on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights.93 In that statement, Israel said that
"[t]he fact that the Palestinian Council does not represent a State does not,
in itself, preclude its responsibility in the sphere of human rights protec-
tion."94 Israel grounds this position in general international law and in the
agreements between Israel and the PLO.95 The willingness of Israel to hold
the Palestinian Authority accountable under human rights law, so different
from the caution and reservation that other states express, is directly
related to Israel's denial of its own responsibility with respect to the exer-
cise of those powers and responsibilities that it had transferred to the
Palestinians.96
A state's immediate stake in attributing human rights obligations to
NSAs is also evident in Moldova's periodic report to the Human Rights
Committee, where it argued that "the secessionist regime structures have
violated in a systemic and deliberate way the human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms in this region,"97 and proceeded to provide examples of the
"authoritative and antidemocratic character of the secessionist regime of
Tiraspol, which violates in a flagrant way the human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms."98 Moldova's stake in the matter included not only the rejec-
tion of its own responsibility, which the Human Rights Committee had
already acknowledged was limited with respect to Transnistria because of
OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTS. & HUMAN RIGHTS (ODIHR), OSCE HuMAN DIMENSION
COMMITMENTS: THEMATIC COMPILATION 25-30 (2d ed. 2005).
92. Press Release, EU-PA Human Rights, Good Governance and Rule of Law Sub-
Committee, Human Rights and Rule of Law at the Heart of the EU - Palestinian Rela-
tionship, PR/05/2010 (Feb. 26, 2010) ("Prime Minister Fayyad has made enormous
progress in preparing the Palestinian Authority for statehood based on the rule of law
and in the spirit of good governance, even under the current difficult political environ-
ment. The EU is working in close partnership with the Palestinian Authority to assist its
efforts in the field of human rights, good governance and the rule of law on the basis of
jointly agreed objectives."').
93. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Implementation of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Additional Information Submitted by States
Parties to the Covenant Following the Consideration of Their Reports by the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Israel Addendum, U.N. Doc. E/1989/5/
Add.14 (May 14, 2001).
94. Id. cl 4.
95. Id. ("[Tihis is also evident under article XIX of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip .... Similarly, under article 11 (C) (4) of
the Wye River Memorandum, the Palestinian Police is obliged 'to exercise its powers and
responsibilities with due regard to internationally accepted norms of human rights and
the rule of law, and be guided by the need to protect the public, respect human dignity
and avoid harassment."' (emphasis added)).
96. Id. 3. ("In light of this changing reality, and the jurisdiction of the Palestinian
Council in these areas, Israel cannot be internationally responsible for ensuring the
rights under the ICESCR in these areas.").
97. Human Rights Comm., Second Periodic Reports of State Parties, Republic of
Moldova, 9 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/MDA/2 (Dec. 26, 2007).
98. Id. 9 17.
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Moldova's limited control,9 9 but also the delegitimization of the Transnist-
rian regime. Turkey similarly attempted to reject claims of state responsi-
bility before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the ground
that a territorial NSA-the TRNC-was responsible. 10 0 Turkey claimed the
following:
[T]he "TRNC" is a democratic constitutional State with impeccable demo-
cratic features and credentials. Basic rights are effectively guaranteed and
there are free elections. It followed that the exercise of public authority in
the "TRNC" was not imputable to Turkey. The fact that this State has not
been recognised by the international community was not of any relevance in
this context. 10 1
Unlike the Israeli-Palestinian Authority situation, Turkey's denial of its
own responsibility did not hinge on establishing the TRNC's responsibility
because Turkey denies occupying the TRNC altogether and, therefore,
denies holding any residual legal responsibility for the human rights of the
local population. Another difference is that Turkey's argument does not
necessarily indicate its position on the responsibility of NSAs, because it
treats the TRNC as a state, albeit an unrecognized one. In another instance
of alleged occupation, the Russian Federation has denied its responsibility
under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) for the acts of
the Transnistrian authorities. However, it did not impute the acts to the
Transnistrian authorities themselves but to Moldova.102 Again, this offers
little indication of the Russian Federation's stance towards NSAs, since it
did not identify the Transnistrian authorities as an alternative duty-holder.
Moreover, the Russian Federation-or Turkey for that matter-will not
likely argue for NSA responsibility before the ECtHR nor under the specific
provisions of the ECHR, which is clearly binding only on states.
A nuanced approach is evident in annual human rights reports of the
U.S. Department of State. In some cases, a report on a particular state
addresses the conduct of territorial NSAs that operate within that state,
following its review of the state's government practices. For example, the
annual report on Moldova does not refer specifically to the area of Trans-
nistria, but instead addresses the conduct of Transnistrian authorities
within the same report on the Moldovan government.103 Similarly, the
reports on the practices of the "entities" Somaliland and Puntland, as well
as of al Shabaab, which is regarded as having "controlled most of the south
99. Human Rights Comm., 75th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human
Rights Committee: Republic of Moldova, 9 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/75/MDA (Aug. 5,
2002) ("While accepting that the Moldovan authorities' control over the Transnistrian
region is limited and that parallel structures of governance have established themselves
there, the Committee must nonetheless be in a position to assess the enjoyment of Cove-
nant rights in the entire territory under the jurisdiction of the State party.").
100. See Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
21-22 (1995).
101. Id. at 22.
102. See Ilascu v. Moldova, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 260.
103. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2011 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HuMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES:
MOLDOVA (2012).
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and central regions," are incorporated with the sections on the practices of
the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia.10 4 Until the Sri Lankan
military defeated the LTTE in 2009, the conduct of the LTTE was reviewed
in the same report as the conduct of Sri Lanka.' 0 5 In a different fashion,
the report on Cyprus contains two separate sections: one on the Republic
of Cyprus and the other on "The Area Administered by Turkish Cypriots,"
in which only the conduct of the TRNC is reviewed.10 6 The report on
Israel and the Occupied Territories also contains two sections: one on
Israel and the other on the Occupied Territories. The latter addresses con-
duct within the Occupied Territories by Israel, the Palestinian Authority,
and Hamas.10 7 Differently still, the report on Taiwan is completely sepa-
rate from the report on the People's Republic of China,10 8 and there is no
reporting on Polisario's conduct in either the Western Sahara or Algeria
reports. 10 9 This may be explained by the fact that Polisario operates with
permission from Algeria. Under U.S. policy, which does not recognize the
independence of the Sahrawi African Democratic Republic under
Polisario's rule, Algeria remains answerable for Polisario's conduct. 11 0 Yet
such reasoning is not entirely consistent with the separate reporting on the
Transnistrian and TRNC authorities, for which the Russian Federation and
Turkey could be held responsible. It may be that the latter cases differ
from that of Polisario because holding the Russian Federation and Turkey
answerable would imply that human rights law reaches extraterritorially, a
doctrine which the U.S. contests;"' this, in turn, raises the question why
the report on the Occupied Territories addresses conduct by Israel. Be that
as it may, the overall picture is clearly one of partial acknowledgement of
104. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2011 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES:
SOMALIA (2012).
105. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2008 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAC-
TICES: SRI LANKA (2009).
106. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2011 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: CYPRUS
(2012).
107. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2011 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: ISRAEL
AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (2012).
108. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2011 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: TAl-
WAN (2012); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2011 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES:
CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, HONG KONG, AND MACAU) (2012).
109. There is a separate report on Western Sahara, but it only concerns the responsi-
bility of Morocco. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2010 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAC-
TICES: WESTERN SAHARA (2011). The report on Algeria only mentions that "Sahrawi
refugees lived predominantly in camps near the city of Tindouf, administered by the
Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia el Harma and Rio de Oro (Polisario)" and
that "[n]either the government nor refugee leadership allowed the UNHCR to conduct a
registration or complete a census of the Sahrawi refugees." The last statement actually
precedes the reference to Polisario; in so doing, the report avoids attaching responsibil-
ity directly to Polisario. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2011 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES: AlGERIA (2012).
110. ALEXIS ARIEFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20962, WESTERN SAHARA 7 (2012), avail-
able at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS20962.pdf; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 67, at 21.
111. Human Rights Comm., 53d Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human
Rights Committee: United States of America, 284, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50
(Oct. 3, 1995).
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the capacity of territorial NSAs to be held responsible under human rights
law.
C. Decisions of Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Bodies
The Committee Against Torture has taken a strong stance on the
capacity of territorial NSAs to be obligated by human rights law, and, spe-
cifically, by the prohibition on torture (the only norm on which the Com-
mittee is mandated to present views). This prohibition is limited under the
Convention Against Torture to acts carried out in an official capacity or
with official instigation, consent, or acquiescence.1 2 Although the Com-
mittee's mandate is limited to complaints against states, it has considered
whether NSAs are also bound by the prohibition in the context of the prohi-
bition on refoulment. Initially, in G.R.B v. Sweden, which involved the
removal of an individual to Peru, the Committee stated that "the issue
whether the State party has an obligation to refrain from expelling a per-
son who might risk pain or suffering inflicted by a non-governmental
entity, without the consent or acquiescence of the Government, falls
outside the scope of article 3 of the Convention." 1 3 Nonetheless, in Elmi
v. Australia, the Committee did not accept Australia's argument to the same
effect and distinguished the case of Somalia from that of Peru., '4 It noted
that for a number of years Somalia has been without a central government
and that some of the factions operating in Mogadishu have set up quasi-
governmental institutions. The Committee also noted that those factions
exercise certain de facto prerogatives that are comparable to those nor-
mally exercised by legitimate governments. Accordingly, the members of
those factions could fall, for the purposes of the application of the Conven-
tion, within the phrase "public officials or other persons acting in an offi-
cial capacity" contained in Article 1.115 The Committee looked at the
conduct of NSAs that fulfilled public functions and found them capable of
being bound by human rights obligations, not only in general, but even
specifically by the prohibition on torture, when acting in a de facto "offi-
cial" capacity.
The position of the ECtHR is less clear. In a number of cases, it con-
sidered applications against removal to Somalia that alleged removal would
violate the right to life and the prohibition on torture. The normative
framework the ECtHR applied is different from that of the Committee
Against Torture, since the definition of torture under Article 3 of the ECHR
is not limited to official conduct or endorsement."' 6 Unlike the Committee
Against Torture, the ECtHR looked to the conduct of the state (Somalia),
finding that the state was unable to provide protection because it had no
112. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, supra note 79, art. 1.
113. Comm. Against Torture, 20th Sess., supra note 76, 6.5.
114. Comm. Against Torture, 22d Sess., supra note 82, T 6.5.
115. Id.
116. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 63, art. 3.
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functioning government. In Ahmed v. Austria, it noted: "The country
[Somalia] was still in a state of civil war and fighting was going on between
a number of clans vying with each other for control of the country. There
was no indication . . . that any public authority would be able to protect
[the applicant]."1 17 In Sufi v. United Kingdom, the court noted that "Article
3 of the Convention may also apply where the danger emanates from per-
sons or groups of persons who are not public officials. However, it must be
shown that the risk is real and that the authorities of the receiving State are
not able to obviate the risk by providing appropriate protection.""
Repeatedly mentioning the risk of ill-treatment by the al Shabaab, the court
carefully avoided labeling such treatment as a "violation" of Article 3, refer-
ring instead to it as a "treatment proscribed by Article 3 in an al-Shabaab
controlled area" and "being exposed to a real risk of Article 3 ill-treat-
ment."' 19 The ECtHR's factual findings could, therefore, be framed as
establishing the failure of the state (Somalia) to protect from torture, as
much as they established the ability of the NSA to violate the prohibition.
In contrast, in Sheekh v. Netherlands, the ECtHR seemed to open the
door for considering NSAs capable of both violating human rights and
responding to human rights needs (which do not necessarily constitute
"obligations" on their part). It began by reiterating that "the existence of
the obligation not to expel is not dependent on whether the risk of the
treatment stems from factors which involve the responsibility, direct or indi-
rect, of the authorities of the receiving country, and Article 3 may thus also
apply in situations where the danger emanates from persons or groups of
persons who are not public officials."' 20 If the risk of violation exists irre-
spective of the receiving state's responsibility even indirectly, the obligation
must lie directly with the NSA. Moreover, the ECtHR referred to the NSA's
conduct as "human rights abuses."121 Nonetheless, as pointed out above,
the ECtHR's statements do not constitute normative determinations with
respect to the conduct of the clan because the court is only mandated to
determine the responsibility of a respondent state.
It is interesting to note the ECtHR's approach to whether the applicants
were able to obtain protection against the risk of human rights violations.
While such protection is usually sought from the state (and thus its
absence may constitute a violation of the state's obligation to protect), in a
number of cases the court noted that such protection was not forthcoming
from the stronger clans in Somalia. In Sheekh v. Netherlands, for example,
it considered the availability of protection specifically from the authorities
in Somaliland and Puntland.122 While this obviously cannot be viewed as
imposing on the clans or on other territorial NSAs an obligation to protect,
117. Ahmed v. Austria, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 2207.
118. Sufi v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07, HUDOC at 49-50
(June 28, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-105434.
119. Id. at 66.
120. Sheekh v. Netherlands, App. No. 1948/04, HUDOC at 45 (Jan. 11, 2007)
(emphasis added), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i-001-78986.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 41.
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it also cannot be taken as a mere factual statement lacking normative sig-
nificance. The state cannot exempt itself from the obligation to protect by
pointing towards a non-state entity, organization, or individual who hap-
pens to offer a similar service. For example, if individuals in a certain state
are at risk of attack by racist movements, the state cannot rely on privately
operated neighborhood watches to relieve it of the duty to act against
potential violators. This is true not only for protection through means
reserved for states such as legislation, but also for physical protection.12 3
Protection offered by Somaliland and Puntland does not therefore, in itself,
affect Somalia's obligations. Thus, it appears that the ECtHR was con-
cerned with the conduct of the NSAs not merely as a factor in assessing the
state's conduct; the NSAs' conduct also has some normative significance.
D. Reports of Internationally Appointed Experts
The wording that the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary
or Arbitrary Executions adopted makes it abundantly clear that he regards
NSA responsibility under international human rights law as a matter of lex
ferenda rather than lex lata. In 2006, the four Special Rapporteurs
assigned to a joint mission to Israel and Lebanon following the Second
Lebanon War-one of whom was Philip Alston, the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions-relied on Alston's earlier
report in concluding that Hezbollah
remains subject to the demand of the international community, first expressed
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that every organ of society
respect and promote human rights. The Security Council has long called
upon various groups . . . to formally assume international obligations to
respect human rights. It is especially appropriate and feasible to call for an
armed group to respect human rights norms when it "exercises significant
control over territory and population and has an identifiable political
structure."1 2 4
This statement carefully remains within the political sphere. It speaks
of a demand based on a document of ambiguous legal status, namely of
what is possible rather than what is required under law. In contrast, the
Goldstone Commission noted in 2009 that "it is clear that non-State actors
that exercise government-like functions over a territory have a duty to
respect human rights," applying this to both the Palestinian Authority and
Hamas.' 2 5 The Commission further emphasized that, "all parties to an
123. This is all the more true when the private bodies providing the protection are
themselves acting in violation of human rights, as do the clans in Somalia. Id. at 30-31.
124. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Special
Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Stan-
dard of Physical and Mental Health, Representative of the Secretary-General on Human
Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, and Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as
a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, Mission to Lebanon and
Israel, Human Rights Council, 9 19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/7 (Oct. 2, 2006) (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).
125. Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab
Territories, 12th Sess., Sept. 14-Oct. 2, 2009, TT 305-07, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48
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armed conflict have the obligation to respect the enjoyment of human
rights by all."1 26 The Commission provided an account of alleged human
rights violations by the Gazan authorities and stated that "the Gaza author-
ities have an obligation to respect and enforce the protection of the human
rights of the people of Gaza, inasmuch as they exercise effective control
over the territory, including law enforcement and the administration of jus-
tice." 127 The Commission also noted that the Palestinian Authority and
the Gazan authorities voluntarily undertook this obligation.128
In 2011, the U.N. Secretary-General's Panel of Experts on Accountabil-
ity in Sri Lanka also seemed to accept the notion of direct NSA responsibil-
ity when it "proceeds on the assumption that, at a minimum, the LTTE was
bound to respect the most basic human rights of persons within its power,
including the rights to life and physical security and integrity of the per-
son, and freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
and punishment," since it was "exercising de facto control over a part of a
State's territory."1 29
Finally, the Officer of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Mis-
sion to Western Sahara and the Polisario-run refugee camps in Tindouf,
Algeria refused to relieve Algeria from the responsibility to ensure that the
rights stipulated in the human rights instrument to which it is party are
upheld for all persons on its territory.130 At the same time, it considered
the SADR's practice relating to the rights of association, expression and
movement. While it did not label this practice a "violation," it implied that
the obligation to respect the enumerated rights lay with Polisario.' 3 1
Conclusion
There is no doubt that territorial NSAs are capable of carrying out acts
that, if carried out by states, would be regarded as violations of human
rights law. Holding territorial NSAs obligated under international human
rights law will naturally benefit the individuals under the effective control
of these territorial NSAs, at least if this obligation can be enforced effec-
tively. Yet, at present, customary international human rights law does not
seem to extend beyond states, nor, obviously, does treaty law. Tentative
(Sept. 25, 2009); see also Human Rights Council, Human Rights Situation in Palestine
and Other Occupied Arab Territories, 10th Sess., Mar. 2-27, 2009, 22, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/10/22 (Mar. 10, 2009).
126. Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab
Territories, 12th Sess., supra note 125, q 310.
127. Id. 91 1369 (footnote omitted).
128. Id. 9 1370. ("Before Hamas took full control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, its
leaders had publicly indicated that they would respect international human rights stan-
dards. In July 2009, the Gaza authorities formally stated to the Mission that they
accepted the obligation to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including
those enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the Palestinian
Basic Law." (footnotes omitted)).
129. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 45, 188.
130. See High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the OHCHR Mission to
Western Sahara and the Refugee Camps in Tindouf, 1 39 (Sept. 8, 2006).
131. Id. ST 43-49.
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steps, however, are discernible towards the inclusion of NSAs in the list of
duty-holders. A review of practice in this respect indicates that effective
territorial control and the exercise of public functions are not sufficient for
states to consider an entity bound by international human rights law.
Other normative and institutional factors are also at play.
States steer away from attributing human rights obligations to NSAs
where doing so has legal implications, such as imposing obligations on
themselves with respect to particular individuals or implying recognition of
formal status of the NSAs. The potential link between states' acknowledg-
ment of NSAs' human rights obligations and the latter being granted inter-
national status is supported by the fact that when states or the
international community are sympathetic to NSAs' demands of interna-
tional status, they are also more willing to acknowledge human rights obli-
gations of NSAs. This link is most prominently apparent in the willingness
to attach obligations and responsibility to the Palestinian Authority and
Hamas. The international community has not only acknowledged the
independent functioning of the Palestinian authorities in these spheres, but
has also welcomed it; under such circumstances, however, independent
functioning also entails obligations.
The link between a state's stance on the question of NSA responsibility
and its immediate repercussions for the state's own responsibility also
operates in the opposite direction: a state is willing to attribute responsibil-
ity to an NSA if this would exonerate the state from responsibility. In addi-
tion, states are less inhibited about imposing human rights obligations on
territorial NSAs in generalized country situations that are removed from
individual events or persons.132 Statements in such contexts are arguably
within the realm of policy rather than hard law and can less easily be con-
strued as implied grants of status. They are, therefore, less intimidating.' 33
In post-conflict and reconstruction situations, too, the engagement of NSAs
in human rights discourse is a political tool for achieving domestic cooper-
ative action' 34 and is geared towards the adoption of best practices, rather
than an expression of opinio juris as to binding legal obligations.
International human rights bodies, both legal and political, have
demonstrated greater willingness than states to attach obligations to terri-
torial NSAs, although their limited mandate does not permit any definitive
conclusions on the matter. In view of their agenda, namely promoting the
protection of the individual, it is not surprising that international human
rights bodies are supportive of expanding the human rights obligations of
any international actor.' 35 The clearly circumscribed mandate of existing
132. All general statements about the human rights practices of various entities are
based on the collection of individual incident reports. However, since those are not
recounted publicly, a country report has no direct practical consequences.
133. For a similar view in the context of Security Council thematic resolutions, see
Constantinides, supra note 61, at 104-05.
134. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMM'N, GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcTVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION - 2009 63 (2010).
135. One must have no illusions that these bodies are immune to political influence
or that they do not consider the wider implications of their decisions. See, e.g., Joshua L.
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judicial and quasi-judicial bodies to resolve specific disputes between indi-
viduals and states is a double-edge sword. On the one hand, these bodies
have no jurisdiction over NSAs, and, therefore, their pronouncements
regarding NSAs' obligations have no formal power. On the other hand, this
normative weakness allows these bodies greater room to maneuver in
developing soft law relating to NSAs without the risk of becoming popular
venues for NSAs to try establishing legal rights and status, a matter which
causes concern in domestic courts. This is all the more true with respect to
the treaty-monitoring bodies, as opposed to the ECtHR, because their views
are not formally binding on states; they thus do not present an insur-
mountable challenge to states' policies.
The confidence with which international bodies invoke human rights
law with respect to territorial NSAs involved in armed conflict can also be
tied to the stage of development of NSA status under international law.
First, the laws of armed conflict already provide NSAs with obligations and
responsibility; thus, extending those to human rights law does not consti-
tute a qualitative leap. Furthermore, the hostility towards international
interference in matters essentially within the domestic realm does not
come into play in international armed conflict. Even with respect to non-
international armed conflict, the growing acceptance of the applicability of
international humanitarian law paves the way for accepting the applicabil-
ity of other branches of law, such as human rights law, despite the domes-
tic context in which the conflict occurs. Moreover, the conflictual
character of non-international conflicts renders it practically impossible to
ignore the notion of NSA responsibility under international human rights
law. First, when a territorial NSA is engaged in armed conflict with a state,
clearly that state cannot be held accountable for harm that the territorial
NSA caused to that state's population;' 3 6 attaching obligations to the NSAs
separately from the state is inescapable. Second, to attach responsibility
under human rights law to one party to the conflict (the state) but not to
the other (the territorial NSA) invites criticism by states of the illegitimacy
of the law, as well as of partiality on the part of those putting forth the legal
framework.' 3 7 The European Union, for example, when endorsing an
expert report on Sri Lanka, referred to the applicability of human rights
law to all parties to the conflict.138
Kessler, The Goldstone Report: Politicization of the Law of Armed Conflict and Those Left
Behind, 209 MIL. L. REv. 69, 72-74 (2011).
136. Parties to an armed conflict have the duty to protect that population by taking
defensive measures. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
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At the same time, one should not overstate the significance of human
rights discourse in the instances mentioned here. Because they involved
armed conflict, they were examined primarily through the prism of the
laws of armed conflict, which overshadowed human rights discourse. An
expert panel on Sri Lanka, for example, explicitly refrained from address-
ing human rights violations beyond those that it had also characterized as
violations of international humanitarian law.139 The binding nature of
international human rights law on the LTTE thereby remained only theo-
retically significant. The expert panel's report does not go beyond those
human rights that are regarded as fundamental, citing "the rights to life
and physical security and integrity of the person, and freedom from torture
and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment."140 Viola-
tions of those rights also constitute international crimes,' 4 ' again an area
in which responsibility of some NSAs has already been established. While
conflict offers an opportunity for rhetoric on the applicability of human
rights law to NSAs, it rarely calls for a move from rhetoric to practice. That
said, it is somewhat ironic that the first tentative steps towards recognition
of NSAs' responsibility under international human rights law emerged in
the context of armed conflict, given that in the past it was precisely in this
context that the responsibility of states under international human rights
law was denied most vehemently.142
In conclusion, the limited practice that exists with respect to human
rights obligations of territorial NSAs does not substantiate a claim that
such obligations constitute customary international law at present.' 43
Some statements and practices imply that NSAs have human rights obliga-
tions, but those are rarely explicit and are not uniform. Nonetheless, while
NSA obligations under human rights law have not yet crystallized as a cus-
tomary norm, international law is progressing towards the establishment
of such obligations.
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